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Repeated game theory has been one of the most prevailing tools for understanding the long-run
relationships, which are footstones in building human society. Recent works have revealed a new
set of “zero-determinant (ZD)” strategies, which is an important advance in repeated games. A
ZD strategy player can exert a unilaterally control on two players’ payoffs. In particular he can
deterministically set the opponent’s payoff, or enforce an unfair linear relationship between the
players’ payoffs, thereby always seizing an advantageous share of payoffs. One of the limitations of
the original ZD strategy, however, is that it does not capture the notion of robustness when the
game is subjected to stochastic errors. In this paper, we propose a general model of ZD strategies
for noisy repeated games, and find that ZD strategies have high robustness against errors. We
further derive the pinning strategy under noise, by which the ZD strategy player coercively set the
opponent’s expected payoff to his desired level, although his payoff control ability declines with the
increase of noise strength. Due to the uncertainty caused by noise, the ZD strategy player cannot
secure his payoff to be higher than the opponent’s, which implies strong extortions do not exist
even under low noise. While we show that the ZD strategy player can still establish a novel kind
of extortions, named weak extortions, where any increase of his own payoff always exceeds that of
the opponent’s by a fixed percentage, and the conditions under which the weak extortions can be
realized are more stringent as the noise becomes stronger.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb, 89.20.Ff, 87.23.-n
I. INTRODUCTION
Repeated games have been representative to explore the
agents’ long-run relationships, which help us in under-
standing how cooperation and competition might arise
among agents with selfish objectives. Extensive litera-
tures have by now utilized repeated games as a basic com-
ponent to analyze economic behaviors, political sciences,
evolutionary dynamics as well as multi-agent systems [1].
It has been commonly accepted that in such games there
is no simple ultimatum strategy whereby one player can
simply occupy an unfair share of the payoffs. However,
Press and Dyson’s discovery of “zero-determinant (ZD)”
strategies illuminates a new starting point [2]. They show
that in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is possible for a
player (named ZD strategy player, ZD player for short)
to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his
and the opponent’s payoff, thereby deterministically set-
ting the expected payoff of the opponent to a fixed value
or ensuring that, when the opponent tries to increase
his payoff, he will always increase the ZD player’s payoff
even more. The discovery of ZD strategies is a milestone
along the way to fundamentally understand how differ-
ent strategies correlate with each other and what are the
underlying norms of social interactions [3, 4]. It provides
us with a powerful but succinct framework for motivating
and sustaining the cooperation required for any society,
as well as for controlling the damages done by the un-
scrupulous or mischievous agents.
ZD strategies have thus attracted considerable atten-
tions and been incorporated successfully into a wide array
∗ zhutou@ustc.edu
of researches, ranging from theoretical game researches
to real-world experimental studies [5]. Among the sub-
sequent researches, Roemheld generalizes ZD strategies
for all symmetric bimatrix games as well as for the Bat-
tle of the Sexes, which is the most common example
for the asymmetric games [6]. Akin explores a broader
space of strategies by extending Press-Dyson theorem,
and obtains the cooperation-enforcing good strategies
[7]. Thereafter, Stewart and Plotkin, as well as Hilbe
et al. identify the intersection of ZD strategies and good
strategies, named generous ZD strategies, which not only
control the payoffs, but also cooperate with others and
forgive defecting opponents, leading the game towards a
win-win situation [8, 9]. Chen and Zinger analyze the
robustness of ZD strategies against evolutionary players
and prove that there always exist evolutionary paths for
ZD player to obtain the maximum payoff [10]. Press and
Dyson’s work can be further generalized to multi-player
ZD strategies for investigating various social dilemmas,
new features and constrains related to participant num-
ber and payoff structure have been revealed and the im-
pact of ZD alliance in multi-player games has been stud-
ied [11, 12]. Furthermore, there are also extensive liter-
atures investigating the significance of ZD strategies in
evolutionary game theory and in social networks [8, 9, 12–
18]. Although initially the evolutionary instability was
found for extortion strategies [14], later it is proved that
the generous strategies finally dominate in population
and are stable in an evolutionary sense [8, 15]. The above
theoretical studies also have been implemented in real-
world social experiments, it is confirmed that extorting
others has limited prospects, and in the long run, gen-
erosity is more profitable [13].
2By now, how the ZD strategies perform in realistic
noisy games is still an open problem. As in Stewart and
Plotkin’s commentary to Press and Dyson’s work [3], one
of the key questions is: how does ZD strategies fare in
iterated games in the presence of noise? Since stochas-
tic perturbations due to observation errors, action mis-
takes, biological mutations and other chance events are
common and inevitable in reality, it is of great impor-
tance to extensively investigate the strategies and solu-
tions in games theory at the presence of noise. However,
the majority of known results on game theory [19], as
well as those related to ZD strategies [5], are obtained in
a perfect environment without any noise. Actually, the
analyses of noisy repeated game have been long-standing
challenges and are at the cutting edge of researches on
game theory and social interactions [19–26]. The errors
in noisy repeated games usually fall into two categories
[20]. The first kind is that players’ actions are often ob-
served with errors, which can be called the perception
errors : someone who claims they worked hard, or that
they were too busy to give a help, may or may not be
telling the truth; similarly, awkward results sometimes
accidentally come after good behaviors [21]. The second
kind is that players may wrongly take an action. This is
categorized into implementation errors (or action errors
in the literature): one player has intended action, but
may accidentally chooses another action due to interfer-
ences, this is also described by the well-known notion
“trembling hands” [22].
To explore the noisy games, a virgin land for ZD strate-
gies, we propose a general framework of ZD strategies
in noisy repeated games, and show the implementable
for a unilateral payoff control. Since repeated games
with perception errors are the most stringent case [1, 19],
our analysis focus primarily on this scenario, and it can
be easily extended to repeated games with implemen-
tation errors. It is found that, ZD strategies present
strong robustness against noise. Even in environments
with perception or implementation errors, a player can
still enforce a linear relationship between the two play-
ers’ payoffs. Under noisy repeated games, we classify the
ZD strategies into three subsets, (i) pinning strategies,
(ii) weak extortion strategies and (iii) strong extortion
strategies. Following the pinning strategy, the ZD player
can unilaterally set the opponent’s payoff to his desir-
able level, although the difficulty for realizing such payoff
control increases as the noise becomes stronger. Further-
more, we prove that since the noise brings uncertainty
and risk to the ZD player, he cannot perfectly secure his
payoff to be always greater than that of the opponent.
That is to say, strong extortion strategies do not exist
even when the noise strength is low. Nevertheless, the
ZD player can still ensure that his own increase of payoff
always exceeds that of the opponent by a fixed percent-
age, such that as long as the opponent tries to improve
his payoff, he will improve the ZD player’s payoff even
more, and the opponent can only maximize his payoff by
fully cooperating, then both players’ payoffs are maxi-
mized but the ZD player outperforms the opponent. We
call such strategy as the weak extortion strategy. The
weak extortion strategy is close to the strong extortion
strategy and the difference between them is caused by
the noise structure. Our study implies that noises expose
the ZD player to uncertainty and risk of losing, while the
mischievous manipulation and the unusual control still
stubbornly persist. The results of our study can be uti-
lized both to propose a generalized framework for the ZD
strategy paradigm that has characterized much of the re-
cent literatures and to provide a unilateral payoff control
scheme for a larger class of noisy repeated games where
payoff control is of great significance but has barely been
studied.
II. NOISY REPEATED GAME
Consider two players engaged in an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) game. In each stage, each player i ∈
{X,Y } takes an action ai ∈ {C,D}. Each player cannot
directly see what action the opponent has taken, but only
observes a private signal ωi ∈ {g, b}, where g and b denote
good and bad signals, respectively. Each player’s signal
ωi is a stochastic variable, affected not only by the two
players’ actions but also by the noises (random errors)
from the environment. Given the actions, every possible
signal profile occurs with a positive probability pi(ω|a),
where ω = {ωX , ωY } and a = {aX , aY } are the observed
signal profile and the action profile, respectively. In each
stage, if player Y chooses aY = C (or aY = D) but X
observes ωX = b (or ωX = g), it means an error occurs.
Denote τ the commonly known probability that neither
player has an error, ε the probability that an error oc-
curs to only one player, and r the probability that an
error occurs to both players, obviously, τ + 2ε + r = 1.
Normally, the values follow the order τ > ε > r > 0
which means the observations of players are more likely
to be correct. For example, if both players take action
C, then pi (g, g|CC) = τ , pi (g, b|CC) = pi (b, g|CC) = ε,
and pi (b, b|CC) = r. The following tables summarize
the signal distributions under all action profiles. Based
on the action and privately observed signal, for a player
X, his private outcomes in each stage game is a tuple
(aX , ωX) ∈ {Cg,Cb,Dg,Db}. Note that this is different
from games without noise, where both players’ outcomes
are identical and are just action profiles.
TABLE 1. Signal distributions for different action profiles
CC ωY = g ωY = b
ωX = g τ ε
ωX = b ε r
CD ωY = g ωY = b
ωX = g ε r
ωX = b τ ε
DC ωY = g ωY = b
ωX = g ε τ
ωX = b r ε
DD ωY = g ωY = b
ωX = g r ε
ωX = b ε τ
Since the stochastic changes of the environment as well
as the opponent’s action is jointly involved in the signals,
3the realized stage payoff for each player depends only on
the action he chose and the signal he received, denoted as
ui(ai, ωi) [1, 19, 23]. Assume that the realized stage pay-
off follows the prisoner’s dilemma, such that ui (C, g) = 1,
ui (C, b) = −L, ui (D, g) = 1 + G, and ui (D, b) = 0,
where L and G are positive variables. According to the
general framework in [23], in each stage, player i’s ex-
pected payoff when two players have an action profile a
is derived as
fi (a) =
∑
ω
ui (ai, ωi) pi (ω|a), (1)
such that fi (a) is the expected value over all possible
signals, conditioning on the two players’ actions. The
expected payoffs under different action profiles CC, CD,
DC and DD are denoted as RE , SE , TE and PE , which
can be respectively calculated according to Eq. (1), as
RE = 1 − (L + 1)(ε + r), SE = −L + (1 + L)(ε + r),
TE = (1 + G)(1 − ε − r) and PE = (1 + G)(ε + r).
Then player X’s expected stage payoff vector is denoted
as UX = (RE , SE , TE , PE) and player Y’s is denoted as
UY = (RE , TE, SE , PE).
FIG. 1. Illustration of the transition from state (joint action)
CC to CD. The green color shows the real action and obser-
vation of player X while the red color depicts that of player
Y. The big nodes denote the action profile, which is the real
states of the game. The small nodes denote the combination
of one player’s action and observation, which are one player’s
private outcomes.
We concentrate on the memory-one strategies where
each player sets his strategy only according to the single
previous outcome [2, 24, 28]. Denote the probabilities
that player X will cooperate under his previous outcomes
Cg,Cb,Dg and Db as p1, p2, p3 and p4 and the probabil-
ities that Y will cooperate under her previous outcomes
Cg,Cb,Dg and Db are q1, q2, q3 and q4. The joint ac-
tions of the two players are the states of the game, and
the two players’ probabilistic strategies as well as the
noise structure jointly determine the transition rule of the
states. Note that the observation errors only changes the
transition probabilities, but never changes the real state
space of the game, which is still {CC,CD,DC,DD}.
For example, if the old state is CC, the probability
that the state transits to a new joint state CD will be:
τp1 (1− q1) + εp1 (1− q2) + εp2 (1− q1) + rp2 (1− q2) ,
where τp1 (1− q1) is the probability that both players
observe correct signals and player X takes action C while
player Y takes actionD in the new stage; εp1 (1− q2) and
εp2 (1− q1) are the probabilities one player has an obser-
vation error and player X takes C and player Y takes
D; and rp2 (1− q2) is the probability that both players
have observation errors and player X takes C and player
Y takes D. The derivation of the transition probability
from state CC to state CD is depicted in Figure 3.
This figure illustrates that the noise decomposes the
state CC into four combinations of private outcomes,
namely (Cg,Cg), (Cg,Cb), (Cb,Cg) and (Cb,Cb). Fol-
lowing the same way, the state transition matrix M of
the noisy repeated game is thus calculated as the matrix
in Figure 2. We can see from this transition matrix, al-
though it becomes more complex, it is still a stochastic
matrix.
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FIG. 2. Transition matrix of noisy repeated game.
III. ZD STRATEGIES UNDER NOISE
Let ut be the probability distribution over the game’s
state space {CC,CD,DC,DD} at stage t. The prob-
ability distributions follow the transition rule such that
ut+1 = ut ×M. The stationary distribution for M is a
vector v such that vTM = vT. Introducing M′ = M− I
into the above equation yields vTM′ = 0. According to
Cramer’s rule, for any matrixM′ and its adjugate matrix
Adj(M′), the equation Adj(M′)M′ = 0 holds. There-
fore from these two equations we know that every row
of Adj(M′) is proportional to the stationary distribution
vector v. Changing the last column of M′ into X’s stage
payoff vector (RE , SE, TE , PE), we get a new matrix M˜.
Then using Laplace expansion on the last column of M˜,
4we have det(M˜) = RE ·N1+SE ·N2+TE ·N3+PE ·N4.
The variables N1, N2, N3 and N4 are just the minors
corresponding to RE , SE , TE and PE in the last column
of M˜, respectively. The fourth row of Adj(M˜) is calcu-
lated from the first three columns of M˜ and is always
proportional to v. Therefore X’s expected payoff can be
calculated by using det(M˜). Adding the first column into
the second and the third columns gives us a new form of
this determinant as in Eq. (2).
det(M˜) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
· · · (τ + ε)p1 + (r + ε)p2 − 1 (τ + ε)q1 + (r + ε)q2 − 1 RE
· · · (r + ε)p1 + (τ + ε)p2 − 1 (τ + ε)q3 + (r + ε)q4 SE
· · · (τ + ε)p3 + (r + ε)p4 (r + ε)q1 + (τ + ε)q2 − 1 TE
· · · (r + ε)p3 + (τ + ε)p4 (r + ε)q3 + (τ + ε)q4 PE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (2)
In this determinant, the first columns is omitted be-
cause we only need to analyze the relationship between
the second column and the fourth column. What’s more
important, we can see that in this determinant, the sec-
ond column is solely controlled by X and the third column
is solely controlled by Y. Record this new format of de-
terminant as D (p,q,UX). Then, player X’s normalized
payoff score under stationary state is derived as
sX =
v ·UX
v · 1
=
D (p,q,UX)
D (p,q,1)
. (3)
Similarly, replacing the last column of det(M˜) by player
Y’s stage expected payoff vector, player Y’s normalized
payoff score is
sY =
v ·UY
v · 1
=
D (p,q,UY )
D (p,q,1)
. (4)
A linear combination of these two scores with coefficients
α, β and γ gives us
αsX + βsY + γ =
D (p,q,αUX + βUY + γUZ)
D (p,q,1)
. (5)
If player X can set his strategy p delicately and
make the second column of this determinant satisfy
p˜ = αUX + βUY + γUZ , then the determinant’s value
D (p,q, αUX + βUY + γUZ) = 0, which indicates that
X can unilaterally establish a linear relationship between
X’s and Y’s payoff scores, such that: αsX +βsY +γ = 0.
Such linear relationship also requires a feasible solution
to the following linear equation set:

(τ + ε)p1 + (ε+ r)p2 − 1 = αRE + βRE + γ,
(ε+ r)p1 + (τ + ε)p2 − 1 = αSE + βTE + γ,
(τ + ε)p3 + (r + ε)p4 = αTE + βSE + γ,
(r + ε)p3 + (τ + ε)p4 = αPE + βPE + γ.
(6)
If this system of linear equations has feasible solutions,
then it will be possible for player X to adjust p1, p2, p3 and
p4 properly to form a linear relationship between his and
the opponent’s payoffs. Since the above unilateral control
strategy is realized by setting a determinant to zero, we
call this the zero-determinant strategy under noise (NZD
strategy for short). Note that when there is no noise
(i.e., τ = 1, ε = 0, r = 0), NZD strategy degenerates to
the original ZD strategy [2].
IV. PINNING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
One specialization of ZD strategies can unilaterally set
the opponent’s payoff to a deterministic value [2]. Simi-
lar strategies were earlier found by Boerlijst, Nowak and
Sigmund [29]. We call such strategies the pinning strate-
gies. Even in the noisy environments, an NZD strategy
can establish a pinning property, although the conditions
are more strict. If player X chooses proper p1, p2, p3 and
p4, such that p˜ = βUY + γ1 (set α = 0), then the fol-
lowing linear equation without player X’s payoff involved
can be formed
βsY + γ = 0 (7)
The above p˜ leads to the following system of linear equa-
tions, which depicts the constrains for the pinning strate-
gies under noise:

(τ + ε)p1 + (ε+ r)p2 − 1 = βRE + γ,
(ε+ r)p1 + (τ + ε)p2 − 1 = βTE + γ,
(τ + ε)p3 + (r + ε)p4 = βSE + γ,
(r + ε)p3 + (τ + ε)p4 = βPE + γ.
(8)
From the first two and the last two equations, we have
β = (τ−r)(p1−p2)
RE−TE
and γ = p1 − 1 + β ·
(r+ε)TE−(τ+ε)RE
τ−r
,
respectively. There are six variables (p1, p2, p3, p4, β and
γ) in four equations, so we have only two independent
free variables. Let p1 and p4 be these two variables, then
p2 and p3 can be rewritten as
p2 =
1
A
· p1 [(τ + ε)TE + (ε+ r) (SE −RE)− (τ + r)PE ]
− 1
A
· (1 + p4) (TE −RE) ,
p3 =
1
A
· p4 [(τ + ε) (RE − SE) + (ε+ r) (PE − TE)]
− 1
A
· (1− p1) [(τ + ε)PE − (ε+ r)SE ] ,
(9)
where A = (τ + ε) (RE − PE) + (ε+ r) (SE − TE). Rep-
resenting both β and γ by p1 and p4 and substituting
them back into Eq. (7) , we finally get the opponent’s
5FIG. 3. Feasible region of pinning strategies and the corresponding pinned payoffs of player Y, under different noises. In each
sub-figure, the shaded area on the p1 − p4 plane illustrates the feasible region of pinning strategies. The corresponding pinned
payoffs are shown as points on the colored surface. The stage game payoffs are calculated by using G = 0.5 and L = 0.5,
thus realized stage payoffs are ui(C, g) = 1, ui(C, b) = −0.5, ui(D, g) = 1.5 and ui(D, b) = 0. The feasible region of pinning
strategies as well as the range of pinned payoffs shrink as the noise strength increases. In (A), the game has no noise, thus the
expected stage payoffs are RE = 1, SE = −0.5, TE = 1.5 and PE = 0. In (B) the game is with a low noise and the expected
stage payoffs are RE = 0.91, SE = −0.41, TE = 1.4 and PE = 0.09. In (C) there is a high noise and the expected stage payoffs
are RE = 0.79, SE = −0.29, TE = 1.29 and PE = 0.21.
payoff, as
sY =
1
B
· (1− p1) [(τ + ε)PE − (ε+ r)SE ]
+ 1
B
· p4 [(τ + ε)RE − (ε+ r)TE] ,
(10)
where B = (1− p1 + p4) (τ − r). It is worth noting that,
besides the noise distribution, sY is only determined by
two components in X’s strategic vector, which are p1 and
p4. By inspecting the payoff of Y, we found that in the
perfect environment (τ = 1, ε = r = 0), player Y’s payoff
degenerates to sY =
(1−p1)PE+p4RE
(1−p1)+p4
.
From Eqs. (8), the only constrain for the existence
of pinning strategies is the probabilistic constrain for
p1, p2, p3 and p4 (i.e., 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1). We numerically
checked the feasible region and the corresponding pinned
payoffs of Y, with noise strength ranging from no noise to
very strong noise. Since p2 and p3 can be represented by
p1 and p4, we only show the feasible region strategies in
p1 − p4 plane. As shown in Figure 3(a), the pinned pay-
off under the perfect environment arches across whole
expected payoff space, ranging from PE to RE . How-
ever, as the noise being introduced, on the one hand,
the feasible region for pinning strategies shrinks, which
indicates the noise brings additional constrains for estab-
lishing NZD strategies. On the other hand, the range of
the pinned payoff also narrows, showing that the NZD
player’s power of payoff control will be weakened by the
noise. In Figure 3(b), when a weak noise is introduced,
the minimum pinned payoff is higher than PE and the
maximum pinned payoff is lower than RE , and as shown
in Figure 3(c), with the noise strength, the range of the
pinned payoff continuously reduces to a very narrow one.
V. EXTORTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
An NZD strategy in Eqs. (6) can be equivalently rewrit-
ten as
p˜ = ϕ [(UX − l1)− χ (UY − l1)] , (11)
where ϕ, χ and l are free parameters. The only usage of ϕ
is to ensure the probabilities to locate in [0, 1]. It is worth
noting that if l ≤ PE , the probability constrains cannot
be satisfied and NZD strategies do not exist. Thus we
only need to investigate different cases when l ≥ PE . In
the case (i) χ → ∞, p is a pinning strategy. In the case
(ii) χ > 1 and l ≥ PE , player X can ensure that, when
player Y tries to increase his payoff, he will increase X’s
even more, and X’s increase of payoff exceeds that of Y
by a fixed percentage χ. In addition, Y can only maxi-
mize his payoff by fully cooperating (q = 1). Therefore,
if player X chooses a p with χ > 1, then X can always ex-
tort Y since Y’s effort will benefit X more than himself.
In the case (iii) χ > 1 and l = PE , player X not only
ensures his payoff increment is χ-fold of Y’s, but also
guarantees that his absolute payoff is always higher than
Y’s, and consequently dominates in the game. Therefore,
we distinguish the second and the third cases, and call
the former weak extortion strategy and the later strong
extortion strategy. It is worth noting that, a strong ex-
tortion strategy is the most stringent case of the weak
extortion strategies. Essentially, the strength of extor-
tion is quantitatively affected by the parameter l, which
can be seen as the baseline of extortion.
Although the strong extortion strategies are found
widely existing in games without noise [2], we prove that
in noisy repeated games, the strong extortion strategies
do not exist. To enforce a strong extortion strategy, ac-
cording to Eq. (5), the following equation set is required
to be satisfied when l = PE .

(τ + ε)p1 + (ε+ r)p2 − 1 = ϕ [(RE − l)− χ (RE − l)] ,
(ε+ r)p1 + (τ + ε)p2 − 1 = ϕ [(SE − l)− χ (TE − l)] ,
(τ + ε)p3 + (r + ε)p4 = ϕ [(TE − l)− χ (SE − l)] ,
(r + ε)p3 + (τ + ε)p4 = ϕ [(PE − l)− χ (PE − l)] .
(12)
However, when l = PE , the third and the fourth equa-
tions can not be satisfied simultaneously. Intuitively, the
missing of strong extortion strategy in noisy repeated
games is due to the reason that, the errors introduce
6stochasticity and uncertainty into the payoffs, and conse-
quently has an negative impact on the accuracy of player
X’s payoff-based strategy setting. Therefore, the NZD
player faces a fundamental tradeoff between the payoff
control ability and the payoff dominance. Such a trade-
off is similar to the relationship between the risk domi-
nance and payoff dominance, which has been discussed
in pioneering works by Harsanyi and Selten [27]. Thus
in a noisy environment, to regain the payoff control abil-
ity, the extortioner needs to relax the extortion baseline
from PE to PE + ∆, which, on the contrary, increases
the risk for him to loss in payoff. We represent the weak
extortion strategy as (χ,∆)-extortion strategy, where χ
defines the extortion rate while ∆ = l − PE defines the
distance between the weak and strong extortion strate-
gies that can be considered as the generosity [8]. When
∆ is small, it is still very likely (though not necessarily)
for player X to always get higher payoffs than player Y,
however, it will be difficult for her to establish an ex-
tortion on player Y’s payoff. A larger ∆ indicates that
player X offers more opportunity for the opponent to win
in payoff, but correspondingly obtains higher possibility
for himself to control the opponent’s payoff. Therefore,
in order to realize a payoff control while reducing the risk
of losing, it is of great importance for NZD player to de-
sign his strategy with a proper extortion ratio χ and a
sufficiently small distance ∆.
According to the analysis above, to get a weak extor-
tion strategy under noise, the following vector equation
is required:
p˜ = ϕ [(UX − (PE +∆)1)− χ (UY − (PE +∆)1)] , (13)
which can be expanded to:
p1 = 1− ϕ
1
τ−r
[F1 − χF2] + ϕ (χ− 1)∆,
p2 = 1 + ϕ
1
τ−r
[J1 − χJ2] + ϕ (χ− 1)∆,
p3 = ϕ
(τ+ε)
τ−r
[TE − PE − χ (SE − PE)] + ϕ (χ− 1)∆,
p4 = −ϕ
(ε+r)
τ−r
[TE − PE − χ (SE − PE)] + ϕ (χ− 1)∆,
(14)
where F1 = (τ + ε)RE − (ε+ r)SE + (r − τ )PE ,
F2 = (τ + ε)RE − (ε+ r)TE + (r − τ)PE , J1 =
(ε+ r)RE − (τ + ε)SE + (τ − r)PE and J2 =
(ε+ r)RE − (τ + ε)TE + (τ − r)PE . As shown in Fig-
ure 4, we numerically checked the feasible region of
weak extortion strategies by exploring the whole space
of ∆ versus different extortion ratio χ. One can see
that the distance ∆ has both lower bound and upper
bound, with the former positively correlated with the
noise strength and the latter negatively correlated with
the noise strength. Combining these two effects, the fea-
sible range of ∆ shrinks while the noise becomes stronger.
In addition, the increasing of lower bound suggests that
the NZD player should relax its extortion baseline l and
move it farther from PE as the noises strength increases.
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FIG. 4. Feasible regions for weak extortion strategies under
different noise strengths. The black curves and red curves de-
pict the lower bounds and upper bounds of ∆ versus χ, respec-
tively. The blue dash lines show the values of RE −PE. In all
sub-figures, player X’s realized payoff is set as uX (C, g) = 1,
uX (C, b) = −0.5, uX (D, g) = 2 and uX (D, b) = 0. The ex-
pected stage payoffs RE , SE, TE and PE are calculated by Eq.
(1). For the noise-free case (A), the lower bound of ∆ is al-
ways 0 and the upper bound of ∆ is always 1, indicating that
NZD strategies always exist for any χ. In the low noise case
(B), the weak extortion strategies with small χ (χ < 1.78) do
not exist, and the feasible range of ∆ becomes larger as the in-
crease of χ after it exceeds 1.78. The lower bound approaches
a value greater than 0 while the upper bound approaches a
value smaller than 0.79. In (C), there is a middle noise, and
in (D), there is a very strong noise. Comparing (A), (B), (C)
and (D), it is found that the feasible region of weak extor-
tion strategies dramatically shrinks with the increase of noise
strength.
When player X adopts a weak extortion strategy, the
payoffs of players X and Y follow the following linear
relationship:
sX − (PE +∆) = χ [sY − (PE +∆)] . (15)
Since in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, TE > RE > PE > SE ,
X’s payoffs when Y chooses action C (TE or RE) are
always larger than his payoffs when Y chooses action D
(PE or SE). The same result holds when player Y mixes
his action. Thus whatever strategy X takes, its expected
payoff sX will be maximized when Y fully cooperates
(q = 1). When X takes weak extortion strategy, since
sX and sY follow a linear relationship, sY will also be
maximized when sX reaches its maximum. Therefore,
both sX and sY are maximized when Y fully cooperates.
Substituting q1 = q2 = q3 = q4 = 1 into det(M˜), the
determinant becomes
det(M˜) = det (p,1,UX)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− (τ + ε) p1 + (ε+ r) p2 0 0 RE
(ε+ r) p1 + (τ + ε) p2 −1 1 SE
(τ + ε) p3 + (ε+ r) p4 0 0 TE
(ε+ r) p3 + (τ + ε) p4 0 1 PE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
(16)
7Making Laplace expansion on the fourth column, we have
det (p,1,UX)
= −RE ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ε+ r) p1 + (τ + ε) p2 −1 1
(τ + ε) p3 + (ε+ r) p4 0 0
(ε+ r) p3 + (τ + ε) p4 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−TE ·
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− (τ + ε) p1 + (ε+ r) p2 0 0
(ε+ r) p1 + (τ + ε) p2 −1 1
(ε+ r) p3 + (τ + ε) p4 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(17)
The normalized payoff for player X is then
sX =
det (p,1,UX)
det (p,1,1)
,
which finally leads to
sX =
1
C
χ [RE (TE − SE)− PE (TE −RE)]
− 1
C
(χ− 1) (TE −RE)∆ +
1
C
PE (TE −RE) ,
(18)
and
sY =
1
C
χP (RE − SE) +
1
C
(χ− 1)∆ (RE − SE)
+ 1
C
[SE (PE −RE) + PE (TE −RE)] ,
(19)
where C = (TE −RE) + χ (RE − SE) > 0. For instance,
if (RE , SE, TE , PE) = (3, 0, 5, 1), we have
sX =
2 + 13χ− 2 (χ− 1)∆
2 + 3χ
, (20)
and accordingly, the payoff for player Y is
sY =
12 + 3χ+ 3 (χ− 1)∆
2 + 3χ
. (21)
In a word, on the one hand, the extortion strategies are
still feasible in noisy environment, which indicates it is
still possible for the NZD player to ensure that when the
opponent tries to improve his payoff, he will improve the
NZD player’s even more. And the opponent will maxi-
mize his own payoff by fully cooperating, where the NZD
player’s payoff is also maximized. Thus the NZD player
can still enforce a weak extortion on his opponent. How-
ever, on the other hand, the uncertainty in the noisy
environment has abated the power of extortion, in the
sense that the extortioner cannot guarantee his payoff
to be always higher than the opponent’s and the strong
extortion strategies do not exist. The baseline for weak
extortion strategies should have a distance to PE , and
the lower bound of the distance has a positive correlation
with noise strength. Under a same extortion ratio χ, the
payoffs for the extortioner and for the opponent under
different noise strengths varies. In Eq. (18) we can see sX
may decline as noisy strength increases. On the contrary,
in Eq. (19), sY may increase as noisy strength increases.
Therefore under a certain noise strength (which results
in a reasonably large distance), it is possible for sY to
outperform sX . These indicate in noisy environments,
when an NZD player wishes to extort the opponent and
control the payoffs, there rises a risk for her to loss in
payoff, especially when the noise is strong. Therefore,
in a realistic uncertain world, extorting others has the
potential to cause damage to yourself.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The concept of ZD strategy has become a promising
framework to explore the long-run relationships. How-
ever, out of the laboratory, the existence of noises in the
environment elevates the complexity of games and the
payoff-oriented ZD strategy selection in such games de-
serves more concrete analysis. We established the gen-
eralized form of ZD strategy for noisy games and named
it NZD strategy. We identify three specifications of
NZD strategies, namely the pinning strategies, strong
extortion and weak extortion. We also study the con-
ditions, feasible regions and corresponding payoffs for
these strategies. It is found that NZD strategies have
high robustness against noise and widely exist in noisy
games with reasonable noise strength, although the noise
has negative impact on the existence and performance of
NZD strategies. The noises will expose the NZD player
to uncertainty and risk, however, it is still possible for
him to set the opponents payoff to a fixed value, or to
extort the opponent.
The implementation of the NZD strategies relays on
the existence of the unique stationary distribution. How-
ever, not only the existence of noisy but also some spe-
cial strategies, may result in bad circumstances such that
the regularity of Markov matrix cannot be satisfied, or
the Markov process may not converge to a unique sta-
tionary distribution. Thus it is essential to analyze the
convergency of the Markov process of the game. This is
not only important to ZD or NZD strategies, but also a
key problem for other topics in repeated games. When
multiple stationary distribution exists, the Markov pro-
cess may have multiple converging states, which belongs
to different communicating classes. In this case, the ex-
pected payoff of each player is strongly affected by the
initial state of the game. We conjecture that, in a game
with multiple stationary distribution, a generalized NZD
strategies whose expected payoff is engaged with initial
distribution, may still exist. Moreover, the speed for the
Markov process to converge is a key factor for the NZD
player. The second-largest eigenvalue of a Markov tran-
sition matrix is a convenient factor to determine which
strategy of the NZD player may lead the game to con-
verge faster. Although the converging speed is not uni-
laterally determined by the NZD player, he can at least
secure himself with a maximized lower boundary of the
converging speed.
Furthermore, the original ZD strategies are not neces-
sarily promoting cooperations, since the Markov process
does not surely converge to a joint state CC. When the
repeated game is played in an imperfect environment,
this becomes even more severe. The generous strategies
[8] not only guarantee a linear relationship between two
players’ payoffs, but also ensure that the mutual coopera-
8tion payoff is the maximum payoff to both the ZD player
and the opponent. Generosity comes at a cost, but it fi-
nally encourages everybody to cooperate. Although the
generous strategies are proved to be very robust in the
perfect environment, whether it exists and how it per-
forms in the noisy environment still need investigation.
In particular, how to provide a strategy that makes the
game always converge to the mutual cooperation state,
even when the noisy have disturbance on the mutual co-
operation? Actually, this topic is strongly related to the
equilibrium analysis in repeated games with private mon-
itoring, which is the one of the most well-known long-
standing open problems in game theory research [19].
The framework of NZD strategies may potentially pro-
vides us with another possible direction to tackle this
issue.
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